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This paper presents the findings of a study undertaken for the South 
African National Treasury regarding the expenditure incidence of social 
spending in South Africa in 2006, and also regarding changes in 
incidence in the period following democratisation. Concentration ratios 
and concentration curves show that there have been considerable shifts 
in social spending incidence in the period  1995 (the year after 
democracy) and 2006, the most recent observation. In particular, social 
spending grants have become a major tool of targeting resources to the 
poor. 
 
Although the poor now get considerably more of social spending than 
their population  share, the very skew underlying income distribution 
means that the post-fiscal situation still is one with great inequality. 
Moreover, evidence is presented that spending efficiency for social 
spending is low, thus there is only a tenuous link between social spending 
and social outcomes. Thus great shifts in social  spending have had a 
limited impact on poverty and inequality in South Africa. 
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1 This study was undertaken for National Treasury under extreme time pressure, as the first preliminary 
report had to be ready to serve as input to the 2009 Budget Review. The study follows and draws from 
two similar studies undertaken by the same author for National Treasury covering the periods 1993-
1997, and 1995-2005.  The paper is also available on the website of the National Treasury:   
http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/Fiscal%20Incidence%20Study/default.aspx 
 
2 Although the author takes full responsibility for this report, the completion of the report would not 
have been possible without inputs from a large number of people. Direct participants in this process 
included Cobus Burger, Eldridge Moses, Pierre de Villiers, Hassan Essop, Ada Jansen, Paula 
Armstrong, Derek Yu, Debra Shepherd, Alex van den Heever and Martin Gustafsson. We wish to 
thank National Treasury for their assistance, particularly Thandokuhle Ngozo, Moses Obinyeluaku, 
Kay Brown and Mark Blecher. We also wish to thank the Departments of Education, Health and 
Housing for special assistance with data requirements.  
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"…it should be emphasized that the impression of preciseness left by the (fiscal 
incidence) studies surveyed here is definitely questionable; the estimates obtained 
in these studies are at best approximations. In any study, the overall effective tax 
rate or the effective tax rates of those income classes that, from a political point of 
view, deserve more attention –  the wealthy and the poor –  can be changed 
considerably by altering the shifting assumptions or by using different 
consumption and income data." (De Wulf 1975: 75) 
 
Introduction 
This study investigates the incidence of social spending (here taken to be spending on 
school and tertiary education, social grants, health clinics,  hospitals, and subsidised 
housing). Combined, spending on these items was R177 billion in 2006 (current value), 
more than 10% of GDP and 37.5% of total consolidated non-interest government 
spending. 
 
Since the turn of the century, strong economic growth, sound fiscal policy, small debt 
service costs, improved revenue collection and a broadening tax base created the fiscal 
space that allowed government to increase consolidated public spending, which grew by 
just over half (52%) in real terms in the six years after 2000. Government expenditure 
increased to just over 27 per cent of GDP in 2007/08, while revenue stood at just over 28 
per cent of GDP. Government is now concerned with assessing to what degree resources 
are directed to programmes that support its  socio-economic objectives of  reducing 
poverty and inequality, creating  employment and enhancing economic growth.  In 
addition to tracking expenditure and reporting on performance to assess the impact of 
expenditure,  this  requires  determining  whether resources are targeted to the areas of 
greatest need and to the most needy. Recent work on public expenditure analysis has 
focused on developing a range of micro-level tools that assist policy decision-makers in 
assessing whether resources are being spent on the correct mix of goods, are well targeted 
to the poor and vulnerable, and are converted into actual services in an efficient manner. 
Expenditure incidence, as discussed in this report, is only one such a tool. 
 
In  1999,  National Treasury (then the Department  of  Finance) initiated research to 
investigate systematically which groups benefited from the budget. Such studies, referred 
to as incidence analyses, attempt to measure government’s effectiveness in redistributing 
income and evaluate whether spending patterns are appropriately targeted to the poor. 
The first of these studies on expenditure incidence focused on about 60 per cent of 
expenditure – education, health, social grants, water provision and housing – between 
1993 and 1997.
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3 Van der Berg 2000a & 2000b; also published as Van der Berg 2001a. For the tax incidence, see Simkins, 
Woolard & Thompson 2000. 
 The study concluded that the first years after political transition saw a 
large and significant shift of social spending from the affluent to the more disadvantaged 
members of society. As a result of shifts in social spending from 1993 to 1997, social 






 assessed the extent of shifts in public spending and taxation between 
1995 and 2000 and the targeting of spending. This second study concluded that, although 
shifts in targeting had slowed down compared to the transition period, spending was well 
targeted to the poor. This applied particularly to social assistance and to a lesser extent to 
school education and to health.  
The objectives of the present study  were  to  investigate  expenditure incidence in 
education, tertiary education, health, social assistance, housing, water provision and 
electricity, and in particular to assess shifts in such incidence between 2000 and 2006. In 
addition, the study set out to compare the results of the previous incidence analyses with 
the new results, where data comparability permits. Unlike on the previous two occasions, 
there was not a tax incidence module attached to the expenditure incidence analysis. Thus 
the study was not constrained to apply to the same year as the Income and Expenditure 
Survey of 2005; rather, to incorporate the most recent data, the emphasis fell on 2006 as 
the end year. 
   
The  strong  growth of the  South African economy  and of government  revenue  had 
allowed the government to expand social spending quite rapidly. The social spending 
items covered in this study increased from about R2 000 per person in 2000 to almost 
R2 800 in 2006, i.e. by 40% per capita (in constant 2000 Rand values). Social grants 
spending more than doubled in this short period. As social grants were the best targeted 
of all government social spending programmes, overall targeting of spending therefore 
also improved. Thus, as will be illustrated, the poorest 40% of the population increased 
their share of spending from 47.1% to 50.1%, which allowed spending per person for the 
poorest 40% to increase by more than R1 200 per year, an increment almost three times 
as large as for the richest 20% of the population. 
 
The next section of this report focuses on the methodology used to arrive at the results, 
discussing ranking of the population by a welfare indicator, measuring access, measuring 
unit cost differentials, determining aggregate fiscal expenditure, and digression briefly to 
summarise the methodology applied to free basic services. This is followed by discussion 
of the results, starting at the aggregate level and focusing first on 2006 before making 
comparisons with 2000 and in some cases with 1995. The conclusion deals with the 
sensitivity of these results to the methodology employed and the data used; broad trends 
and findings; what appears to lie behind these trends; prospects; and limitations of the 
study. 
 
The full quantitative results of the study are reported in appendices tables. In addition, an 
estimation of the order of magnitude of the incidence effect of free basic water is 
contained in Jansen, Burger, van der Berg, Moses and Essop (2009), while some 
background work for this broader study may be found in van den Heever (2009) for 
health, De Villiers (2009) for higher education, and Essop and Moses (2009) for free 
basic services. 
                                                 
 
4 Completed in 2005 in various parts as Van der Berg 2005; Van der Berg et al. 2005; Simkins & Woolard 






Expenditure incidence analysis is concerned with the value of the subsidies given to 
different groups of the population through the budget process. Analysing this requires the 
following steps: 
•  Ranking the population from poorest to richest by some welfare measure (e.g. per 
capita income), and then classifying them into groups (deciles or quintiles) based 
on this indicator. Ranking is of course not necessary if the issue of interest is not 
incidence by income group, but by another category (e.g. province, region or race, 
as in many earlier South African studies). 
•  Once the groups of interest have been identified, it is necessary to determine 
access to the specific social services studied. Such information is usually obtained 
from survey data. 
•  The unit costs of spending need to be determined to establish what value each 
service brings to the individuals concerned. In most international studies the 
implicit assumption is that all beneficiaries get the same unit value from each 
particular service, in which case it is adequate to simply apply the proportionate 
access to the total spending on that service.  
 
The next sub-sections look at each of these issues in more detail in the context of this 
study, before attention turns to a methodology for determining the incidence of basic 
services. 
Methodology: Ranking population by welfare indicator 
The first part of the work involved an analysis of access to services using the Income and 
Expenditure Survey (IES) 2005, the General Household Survey (GHS) 2006 and other 
relevant surveys. This raised some questions  about  linking the distributional patterns 
from the IES2005 to the GHS2006 (the latter contains data on access to services, while 
the former contains income distribution data.) This part of the study involved analysing 
the survey data in order to estimate the availability and access of services for 2006, across 
income groups and population groups. For 2006, there was one difficulty that did not 
exist in 2000. Whereas the IES2000 was linked to the Labour Force Survey (LFS) of the 
same year, there was no such a link between IES2005 and any other survey. This made it 
impossible to link access to services directly to the income distribution obtained from 
IES2005. Thus a major challenge was to link income distribution to access to services, in 
order to determine how services were distributed across the income distribution.  
 
A relatively easy answer appeared to be at hand, viz. to use an asset index to proxy for 
the income ranking, a method that had already been used quite often in South Africa and 
internationally. This method takes recourse to an asset index to determine the ranking of 
households in a similar way as for the distribution of income, and to accept this as the 
welfare ranking of individuals and households, i.e. with the asset ranking proxying for the 
income ranking. The standard procedure is to derive the asset index for households using  
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principal components analysis applied to a wide set of household assets. This asset index 
is then presumed to also reflect the distribution or at least the ranking of households 
across the income distribution. This method is relatively straightforward and could be 
applied without much problem to data from the General Household Survey (GHS) for 
2006 (although such a method gives some deviations in ranking from that obtained using 
income, as became evident when correlating income and the asset index for 2000). 
However, a further problem arose in the case of incidence analysis, viz. that the income 
distribution to be analysed needed to be before the receipt of social grants, as such social 
grants were part of what was being studied, and could therefore not be considered as part 
of income.  Determining  pre-social grant income was  unproblematic  from  the 2000 
dataset that contained both income  and  information on social grants  (assuming  no 
behavioural changes induced by grants), but it became far more difficult if only a 
distribution of assets (wealth)  was available.  A way around that was  to use the 
distribution of income as determined in the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES2005) 
and then to super-impose that on the ranking of individuals obtained from the GHS2006. 
In other words, the ranking of the wealth index was used, but that ranking was then 
applied to the income distribution as determined from the IES2005, in order to derive an 
imputed distribution of income for 2006. From such imputed income was then subtracted 
the value of social grants contained in surveys such as GHS2006, which contained no 
other income data. Thus it was  possible  in this roundabout  manner  to simulate a 
distribution of pre-social grant income that was relatively similar to the distribution that 
would have been obtained from the IES if the IES could have been used for such 
purposes. Visual inspection of most of the access shares of different quintiles between 
this distribution and the distribution that was derived from the simpler asset index before 
considering the distributional effect of the grants showed that the choice of welfare 
ranking had a significant effect only in the case of the social grants, as would be 
expected. 
 
However, even this procedure still had an implicit assumption that the distribution of 
wealth or assets reflected such distribution after the receipt of social grants. Particularly 
in cases where beneficiaries had only recently obtained access to grants, their assets may 
not yet have fully reflected their economic status including such grants. Such an asset 
distribution therefore may to some extent also approximate the distribution of assets as it 
would have been in the absence  of social grants. An alternative was  to assume that 
something between these two situations applied, i.e. that different weights needed to be 





All of this required much work on the different data sets and experimentation with the 
situation in 2000, when all these variables  were available in two  linked  surveys, 
                                                 
 
5 This is in fact also a procedure widely used in international studies, but for another reason: Behavioural 
change may undo some of the effects of grants, and in an overview of studies for the World Bank, Van de 
Walle (1999) concludes that it may be to the extent of 50% of the grant value. However, the difficulty for 
ranking is that it is now know how that coefficient varies over individual households.   
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IES/LFS2000. Using the 2000 data set, one could interrogate the alternative assumptions 
to derive appropriate assumptions and weights for 2006.  
 
Thus considerable difficulties needed to be dealt with before a proper income 
distribution, or income ranking to derive income deciles, could be obtained from the 
survey. However, the effect of grants was largely to change the ranking of individuals in 
the  lower  deciles of the population, and this had  little impact on the rest of the 
distribution. The distribution of many of the services measured in this study differed 
relatively  little across deciles 1  to 4.  So a change in ranking derived  in the manner 
explained above would not necessarily have had much influence on the distribution of 
access to other services, apart from the social grants. The above procedure was thus 
mainly important  to determine access to social grants across the pre-transfer income 
distribution. One needed to understand in which deciles households were before payment 
of grants, and not after the payment of grants. Some households may have been in the 
third or fourth decile because they received grants, but would have been in the first or 
second decile before such grants were paid. If one wanted to understand the effect of the 
grants, one therefore needed to know how households were ranked before such grants 
were paid. 
 
Note that, for international comparison purposes, deciles and quintiles as used here are 
deciles or quintiles of the population (numbers of individuals), not of households. This 
deviates from previous studies, which used deciles/quintiles of households, based on the 
then preference of the Department of Finance. Because of this change, figures cannot 
directly be compared to those for the previous studies, until these have also been 
converted to the same format. 
 
It was possible also to derive the distribution of the population by race group across 
income groups
6
Methodology: Determining access to services 
. This could then later be used to derive costs of services by race where 
the underlying cost  data studied focused on income group (in the case of school 
education). However, in tertiary education, where the costs analysis initially focused on 
race group because of data constraints, the reverse process allowed allocation of these 
costs to the different income groups.  
General trends in some access indicators are discussed by Burger (2009). This analysis 
used comparable datasets to discern access trends, but it should be noted that the periods 
covered did not often coincide with the full interval studied for this paper, thus these 
trends could at best be used to determine recent trends and the stability of data series, not 
trends over the full period studied.  
 
It is useful to give a brief summary here of the way in which access data were obtained, 
and the main patterns these showed, for the different social services studied: 
                                                 
 
6 The term “income group” is here shorthand for the decile or quintile ranking obtained from using a 
particular welfare indicator, be that income or expenditure per capita, or asset ranking.  
 
8 
•  Social grants: This was the easiest information to obtain, as it simply required 
capturing from the surveys the distribution of beneficiaries of grants. The major 
issue to be considered here was that the ranking of households had to exclude 
grant income, as explained above. This effectively meant that many who were not 
among the very poorest were indeed placed in the poorest quintile when their 
grant incomes were subtracted. It was thus not surprising that, based on such a 
welfare ranking, social grants were accessed much more often by those in the 
bottom quintile rather than in Quintile 2.  
•  Schools: Here the datasets were able to give information on children attending 
both primary and secondary schools. Unlike in the previous study, the distinction 
between these levels did not play a major role in the calculations. 
•  Tertiary education: Access here again seemed relatively straightforward to 
measure. However, there were some problems. Firstly, the distinction between 
universities and technikons still existed in 2000, but not in 2006. Also, survey 
data  were  not consistent with official records, but were required to distribute 
spending by race as  determined from official data across income groups. In 
addition, tertiary students often are no longer resident in their home of origin, so 
the socio-economic status (e.g. income or assets) recorded for them in the surveys 
may no longer have reflected that of their household of origin. Thus many of 
those recorded as being in the fourth or even the fifth quintile, i.e. the more 
affluent, may  actually  originally be from poor rural households, but now be 
resident in better, usually urban, circumstances. Thus there would be a bias to 
under-record targeting of the poor in tertiary education. 
•  Clinics and hospitals: The General Household Survey provided information on 
visits to various health facilities. Visits by members of Medical Aid schemes were 
ignored,  on the basis that such recorded visits may  have reflected confusion 
between public and private health facilities, or often were fully paid for by the 
patients concerned, i.e. were  not subsidised by the state. For individual 
households, the information was incomplete, as the question only asked about the 
last visit. However, this still allowed an analysis of the patterns of usage of such 
facilities, and in particular ascertaining  whether the patterns strongly  differed 
across the income distribution. This was indeed the case, with more affluent 
patients being far less likely to visit public health facilities. In contrast, for poorer 
people residing in urban areas,  proximity of hospitals made the latter more 
accessible, leading to a trend towards peak utilisation of these facilities in the 
poorer part of the urban population. This pattern was similar to that for housing 
subsidies. The major beneficiaries thus tended to be in Quintiles 3 and 4. 
•  Housing: The GHS allowed the beneficiaries of housing subsidies to be identified 
directly, by asking whether the house was obtained through a housing subsidy. 
Comparing this to the assumption made in previous studies, when such data were 
not yet available, showed that the assumption that was formerly used gave the 
correct pattern of benefits. This earlier assumption was that the distribution of 
beneficiaries of housing subsidies across  the income distribution followed the 
same pattern as those households which were resident in urban areas but did not 
live  in formal housing, and within the appropriate means test categories for 
housing subsidies. The pattern obtained by both the new question and the  
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assumption used in earlier studies was that housing subsidies were largely going 
to the middle of the income distribution, viz. those people who were both urban 
and relatively poor (Figure 1). The very poor were more often rural and thus 
generally did not benefit from housing subsidies. 
 
Figure  1:  Distribution of housing subsidies using reported data versus  former 
assumption on housing access, urban location and means test status, 2006 
 
 
Most of the methodology focused on income group (quintiles), but in principle the same 
methodology would also be applied when dealing with race groups.  
Methodology: Determining unit costs for a service 
A separate and parallel process gathered  fiscal expenditure data for the services 
concerned. In this case the major issue to address was whether the unit cost of services 
differed  substantially and systematically across the income distribution or across 
population groups. International studies usually ignore such differences, even where they 
may exist. However, South Africa has a unique history of racial discrimination in unit 
subsidies, although the previous expenditure incidence studies had indicated that such 
differences, which were very common during the apartheid years, largely had been 
eliminated. Nevertheless, given South Africa’s history, it was considered necessary to 
gather fiscal expenditure data in ways that would allow for possible differences in unit 
costs across the distribution.  
Methodology: Determining aggregate fiscal expenditure on social services 
Aggregate fiscal data by service were obtained from a number of sources. The main and 
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Housing
Live in urban informal/traditional  housing/shacks 
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Intergovernmental Fiscal Reviews. However, in some cases these did not contain data at 
the required level of disaggregation. Thus estimates of the distribution of health spending 
by category were used for health and hospital spending
7
 
, spending on universities (and 
technikons for 2000) was taken from data provided by the National Department of 
Education, and the value of aggregate housing  subsidies was obtained from the 
Department of Housing.  The social spending included in this study covered 68% of 
consolidated general government expenditure on the social spending function, including 
by functional classification – 84% of spending on education (covering all ordinary school 
education and tertiary subsidies), 70% on health, 68% on social security and 64% on 
housing. (The functional classification includes social security spending funds, thus 
reducing these percentages.) 
Figure 2 shows quite substantial real growth of the social spending included in this study 
since 2000. Overall, such spending increased more than 50% in the six years, with the 
strongest growth occurring with respect to social grant spending, which increased by 
127%. There was also strong growth of spending on public clinics, by 67%. In contrast, 
other sectors grew less than the average rate, with tertiary education recording only 15% 
growth. Social spending per capita grew in real terms by 21% in 1995-2000 and a further 
40% in 2000-2006, taking it to R2 788 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Growth of social expenditure per capita, 1995– 2006 
 
 
The rapid growth of social grants sharply  increased  their share of aggregate social 
expenditure from 20% to 30% in the short six year period, with a consequent reduction in 
                                                 
 
7 Mark Blecher of National Treasury kindly provided these 
















the share of most other sectors, notably school education (the largest social spending 
category), which declined from 42% to 38% of the total, and tertiary education, that 
declined to only 6% (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Composition of social spending covered in this study, 2000 and 2006 
      2000 
      2006 
Methodology: Free basic services 
This study also set out to investigate the impact of the provision of free basic municipal 
services, namely water and electricity. This has a slightly different impact and works in a 
slightly different way than other services, due to cross-subsidisation of such basic 
services within municipal boundaries by the rich for the poor. The impact of this had to 
be measured. As had been indicated in the terms of reference, this part of the study could 
only be completed successfully if good data were available, as had been indicated would 
be the case but turned out not to be true (Essop and Moses, 2009).  Discussions with 
many officials, including National Treasury, indicated that no such data existed at the 



























of free basic services on the position of the poor and the non-poor. Nevertheless, two 
routes were followed to get to grips with the issue, at least at a case study level. Firstly, 
the aggregated national level data were investigated with the intention of measuring the 
orders of magnitude of the value of these services relative to all services, and specifically 
for poor households. Secondly, a dataset available for some Cape Town suburbs was used 
to show the impact of free basic water and the so-called Incremental Block Tariff (IBT) 
structure, which had already existed before the introduction of the free basic services. 
This is set out in Jansen et al (2009). From this, it transpired that the policy of free basic 
water along with the IBT were substantially redistributive within municipal boundaries. 
But the fiscal magnitude of this redistribution  was quite small when compared, for 
instance, to the impact of social grants. Secondly, the introduction of free basic water did 
increase the benefits of those poor households who had access to metered water, but the 
larger  part of this benefit  pre-dated  the introduction of this policy, through the IBT. 
Thirdly, though cheaper water could also potentially have increased the consumption of 
water by the poor, a study of the demand for water indicated that it is very price inelastic 
amongst the poor (Jansen & Schultz 2007), thus water consumption may not have been 
affected much and the major gains to the poor were largely the cost reduction. Fourthly, 
most of the very poor  did  not have access to metered water (they were  often rural 
inhabitants or lived in informal housing), thus the gains were especially large amongst the 
third to sixth deciles of the income distribution and not amongst the poorest two deciles. 
Fifthly, unlike other social services that were funded from the national budget through the 
tax system, basic services were  funded at municipal level through municipal utilities 
which generally tried to break even or even make an operating profit. Thus it is safe to 
assume that free or lower cost services for the poor came from higher unit costs and 
therefore also aggregate costs for the rich. This was largely paid by households in the top 
decile. This transfer from the rich to the poor was quite substantial, but not compared to 
aggregate incomes. Sixthly, due to a modest negative  price elasticity of water 
consumption amongst the rich, higher water tariffs also reduced their water consumption 
somewhat and thus acted as an instrument of water demand management. 
Results 
Results: Unit costs 
Before turning to the results on social spending generally, the findings with respect to 
unit costs are first discussed. Spending in 2006 was no longer racially discriminatory. 
Levels of subsidies still differed across beneficiaries only in schools and in tertiary 
education. In school education, the costs of teacher salaries were higher in more 
advantaged schools because teachers in these schools were generally better qualified and 
more experienced, and because richer schools still had more non-teaching staff on their 
public payrolls. But on the other hand, the government’s norms and standards policy 
allocated disproportionately more non-personnel spending to poorer schools, a policy that 
was accelerated with the introduction of no-fee schools. Also, with schools being open to 
all, spending per child differed little – whereas the average white child in the early 1990s 
obtained a subsidy for education of about 4.50 times as much as a black child, this 
disparity had largely been eliminated by 2006. The 20% advantage that remained per 
white child largely reflected historically better staffed schools and also a larger share in  
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secondary schools, which are more heavily subsidised. Across the income distribution, 
for all practical purposes no differences in net education subsidies remained between 
schools attended by rich and by poor children. 
 
The investigation into schools costs drew from two recent studies that involved members 
of the research team (Gustafsson & Patel 2006; the Van der Berg & Louw 2007). After 
adjustments to incorporate more recent changes (the extension of funding to poorer 
schools), it was easy to obtain the total costs per school quintile. To link the school 
quintiles to the household income distribution, three educational datasets were used: 
SACMEQ 2001, TIMSS 2003, and PIRLS 2006. First  a ranking of individuals was 
obtained using an asset index as described before for the income distribution. Schools 
were then ranked into school quintiles using the average value of this SES (socio-
economic status) indicator of the children in the school concerned. Then the distribution 
of individual children in population quintiles was obtained and matched to the school 
quintiles. This could then be used to allocate costs across the income distribution.  
 
In tertiary education, subsidies paid to universities for students in the natural sciences 
were approximately two and a half times as large as for social science and humanities 
students. Consequently, because fewer black students attended natural sciences courses, 
they made a smaller fiscal claim on the state, on average. They were at a disadvantage of 
almost 16% in terms of public subsidies to their universities compared to white students. 
(Special schemes to assist disadvantaged students, for instance through loan and bursary 
schemes through the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) that is referred to 
later, were not considered in this calculation, but see also the discussion later on the 
impact of the NSFAS.) 
Results: Targeting of spending 
Overall, social spending is now well targeted, as can be seen from the concentration ratio. 
This ratio  is a measure similar to the Gini coefficient: It is positive when spending 
favours the rich, zero when spending is completely evenly distributed and negative when 
spending favours the poor. This ratio improved from –0.112 to –0.152 from 2000 to 2006 
(Table 1), a considerable improvement to a level that indicates extremely good targeting 
of spending on the poor. To put these figures in perspective, in more than 30 developing 
countries where this measure had been calculated for spending on specific services, 
Yaqub (1999) obtained  a  mean value of  0.01 for all school education, and 0.39 for 
tertiary education. For South Africa, the indices were an impressive –0.13 for school 
education, but, for reasons which will be discussed, an extremely poor 0.64 for tertiary 
education. In health, where Yaqub encountered not a single example in his sample of a 
concentration index with a negative value, the South African index for health clinics was 





Table 1: Concentration ratios by social sector, 2000 and 2006 
  2000  2006 
School education  -0.121  -0.128 
Tertiary education  0.528  0.641 
All social grants   -0.371  -0.359 
•  Child support grants  -0.247  -0.318 
•  Disability grants  -0.291  -0.288 
•  Old-age pensions  -0.412  -0.436 
Health   -0.118  -0.137 
•  Public clinics  -0.177  -0.257 
•  Public hospitals  -0.105  -0.103 
Housing  0.160  0.070 
Total across services  -0.112  -0.152 
 
Why was South African social spending so well targeted? The reasons did not always 
have to do with good policy or delivery, though government had gone out of its way to 
ensure good targeting and access for the poor to social services. For social grants, the 
means test ensured targeting at poorer members of the population. In education, the fact 
that  there  were  more  children amongst the poor automatically  meant  that  education 
spending benefited the poor more than proportionately. In health, the more affluent often 
opted  out of public health services, often because of quality concerns, thus the poor 
receive a larger share of health subsidies than expected. 
 
Despite social spending being so well targeted, targeting within most individual social 
sectors had not much improved (see again Table 1). On the contrary, according to the 
measured concentration ratios by sector, two sectors saw a worsening of targeting:  
•  Spending on social grants became  slightly  less targeted. This perhaps  derived 
from a weakening of the application of means testing (the less stringent means test 
criteria that were recently announced will strengthen this trend). But the more 
important reason was the increased weight of the child grants, which were far less 
targeted than the earlier dominant social old-age pensions. 
•  There was been a major worsening, according to the data, of the already poor 
targeting in tertiary education. However, this may also be a data issue, and in 
particular the issues referred to earlier with regard to measurement of targeting in 
tertiary education may have played a growing role here. This issue is returned to 
below. 
 
Despite worsening of targeting in some individual social spending categories, overall 
targeting improved, largely driven by the increased weight of social grants referred to 
before, but also by some further improvements in targeting subsidies of public clinics, 
which improved the targeting of health spending. There was also some improvement of 




Targeting of all social spending is also shown by the concentration curves for social 
spending for the three years covered by this study, 1995, 2000 and 2006. The 
concentration curve is drawn similar to the Lorenz curve: First the population is ordered 
from poorest to richest by the welfare measure (in this case per capita income before 
social grants, i.e. actual incomes from which social grants have been subtracted before 
the per capita measure was calculated). Then the cumulative share of the social spending 
is shown against the cumulative share of population. Where the concentration curve lies 
above the diagonal, it implies a negative value for the concentration ratio that is 
calculated exactly as for the Gini coefficient, as the area between the curve and the 
diagonal, expressed as a share of the area below the diagonal. As can be seen in Figure 4, 
the curves for combined social spending have been above the diagonal in all three years, 
but the clear outward shift over time reflects improved targeting and a concentration ratio 
that is a growing negative number. The concentration curve can also be redrawn in 
difference terms as the vertical distance between the curve and the diagonal, and then 
rescaled, as in  Figure  5.  This  shows,  on a larger scale,  the  distance by which the 
concentration curve lies above (or below, in some other cases not shown here) the 
diagonal. This aggregate measure of targeting of spending clearly improved. 
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Figure 5: Concentration curves: Alternative presentation (distance above diagonal) 
 
 
As indicated above, racial and other biases no longer affected the incidence of fiscal 
expenditure in 2006. Moreover, due to good access to services and good targeting of 
many services, the poor were not excluded from benefiting and were often even at an 
advantage. Figure 6 shows that the poorest 40% of the population
8
•  Firstly, weak performance of many schools attended by poor children effectively 
prevented  many  from  completing school or obtaining endorsement  in the 
matriculation  exam. This limited  their opportunity of attending tertiary 
institutions.  
 received more than 
their share of the benefits of public spending: They got a full 50% of the value of all 
social spending. They benefited especially from spending on the three main social grant 
types (obtaining between 59% and 70% of such spending) and for public clinics (57%), to 
which they  had  good access,  while the more affluent  seldom visited  such clinics. In 
school education (49%) and in public hospitals (45%) as well, the poor still obtained 
more than their share of subsidies. The two exceptions, though, were in housing and in 
tertiary education, where they received only 24% and 4% respectively of all subsidies. 
Housing subsidies were not well targeted at the poor because such subsidies largely went 
to  urban  residents,  while  the poorest people  often resided  in rural areas. In tertiary 
education, however, the extremely low proportion of subsidies estimated to go to the poor 
was the result of three factors:  
                                                 
 
8 Note that in the preceding studies (reported in previous Budget Reviews), data were shown per quintile of 
households. The poorest 40% of households in those cases constituted almost 50% of the population. This 
study, however, follows the norm that has now internationally been adopted in studies of this kind, viz. to 
show incidence by the distribution of population rather than of households, i.e. quintiles now are equal 









































































•  Secondly, poor children who did perform well enough to qualify to enter tertiary 
education often lacked the financial resources to do so. The NSFAS assisted a lot, 
but the actual and opportunity cost of studying (not being able to earn) remained 
an impediment to many students. 
•  Thirdly, the data relating to access to tertiary education were probably biased. 
Estimates were based on household surveys, but many students were no longer 
resident in their families of origin, so this may have lead to a poor capturing of 
their home background in surveys. 
 
Yet, despite the issues that made entry into tertiary education difficult, Table 2 shows the 
rapid expansion of tertiary access and performance (measured by degrees, diplomas and 
certificates awarded). It is also evident that this applied across race groups and the two 
broad fields of study. The increase in black enrolment in Natural Science courses of 
almost 50% in this six year period is particularly impressive; in terms of awards the 
growth was even greater. The loan and bursary support offered by NSFAS must have 
contributed in an important way to this increased access. NSFAS spending from public 
resources (including aid, but excluding funds obtained from repayment of loans) grew 
from R510 million in 2000 to R1 358 million in 2006, and the number of loans and 
bursaries awarded grew from 83 769 to 107 586. But despite the undoubted importance of 
this spending for improving access, the relatively small magnitude of NSFAS within 
broader  social  spending  means that its social incidence impact  is quite small: Under 
favourable assumptions it increases spending on the black population by about R29 per 
member of the population, an almost  30%  addition to their benefits from tertiary 
education spending, but this increases their aggregate benefits from social spending by 
only 1½%. Moreover, only a minute part of this spending goes to the very poor.  
 
Table 2: Access and performance in tertiary education by race and field of study, 
2000 & 2006  
Race  2000  2006 
Full time Student enrolment (headcount) 









Blacks  255 092  83 964  339 056  327 306  123 677  450 983 
Coloureds   21 770  8 692  30 462  36 009  12 521  48 530 
Indians   24 999  14 466  39 465  38 318  16 500  54 817 
Whites  107 006  55 606  162 612  126 138  58 342  184 480 
Total  408 867  162 728  571 594  527 770  211 040  738 810 
Degrees/diplomas/certificates awarded 
Blacks   39 683  9 416  49 099  52 731  17 239  69 970 
Coloureds   3 143  1 314  4 457  5 610  2 200  7 810 
Indians   3 714  2 264  5 978  5 210  2 896  8 106 
Whites  21 379  11 159  32 538  25 321  13 196  38 517 




Figure 6: Share of spending received by the poorest 40 % of the population by social 
spending category, 2006 
 
 
The overall spending on the social services covered in this study in 2006 (R177 billion in 
nominal terms) was not much more than the overall value of personal income taxes paid 
(R141 billion). It is conceptually useful to think of both social spending and personal 
taxes as fiscal interventions that alter the distribution of the overall resources (private and 
public) at the disposal of people, i.e. through the market and in the form of social services 
that people consume (Bromberger 1982).  
 
As explained earlier,  to determine the benefit of social spending, households  were 
ordered in terms of their income before social spending, i.e. by income per person 
excluding the value of any social grants that they may have received. Thus one can think 
of  three distributions:  a distribution of income before  grants, subsidies and taxes;  a 
distribution after grants and subsidies had been added to households’ resources; and a 
final distribution that also excluded personal taxes households paid. For each of these, a 
Lorenz curve could be drawn and a Gini coefficient calculated. (Note, however, that none 
of these is  the normal Gini coefficient  for all income and that  none  is  therefore 
comparable to Gini coefficients published for other countries.) The Gini for pre-transfer 
income was 0.69, but it dropped to 0.52 for income plus benefits and to 0.47 after taxes 
had also been subtracted (Figure 7 and Table 3). This illustrated three things: 
•  The South African fiscal process was highly distributive. 
•  Social spending had an especially large impact on inequality, reducing a Gini so 
calculated by far more than even the progressive income tax system did. 
•  Even after all redistributive spending and taxes had been considered, inequality 







































































































































































and the need for a reduction of inequality in the market. The latter is best achieved 
through a combination of human capital improvements and a growing economy.  
 
Figure  7:  Lorenz curves for three welfare measures  in  2006: Pre-grant income, 




Income distribution data for 2000 and 2006 were not strictly comparable, so not too much 
should be read into the fact that the Gini coefficient of pre-grant income was smaller at 
0.69 in 2006 compared to 0.71 in 2000. However, assuming an unchanged progressivity 
of the tax system after 2000, the expansion and improved targeting of social spending had 
made the budget more redistributive, reducing the Gini-coefficient  for post-fiscal 
resources by 0.14 in 1995, by 0.18 in 2000 and by 0.22 in 2006.  
 
The last columns in Figure 8 that show total spending per person confirm  that such 
spending increased substantially in real terms between 1995 and 2006, as has also been 
shown before. By far the largest part of this increase occurred after 2000, reflecting the 
strong growth of the economy and government revenue in this period. As the figure 
shows, gains in social benefits were recorded right across the distribution, but the gains 
for the poor were particularly large. An important reason for this was the rapid growth of 
social grant spending, the best targeted of all social spending programmes. Improved 
targeting was also reflected in the concentration index, which improved somewhat from –
0.095 in 1995 to –0.112 in 2000, and then even much more rapidly to –0.152 in 2006. In 
real terms, social spending per person for the poorest 40% of the population increased 
more than two and a half fold over eleven years, from only R1 373 in 1995 to R2 329 in 
2000 and R3 532 in 2006 (all in 2000 Rand values). This reflected both the aggregate 












































Cumulative % of population
Diagonal (Equality)
Income minus taxes plus 
social spending benefits 
2006
Income plus benefits of 
social spending (before 
taxes) 2006
Income before grants 2006
Gini coefficient 2006:
Income excluding grants 0.69
Income plus benefits of social spending 0.52
Income minus taxes plus social spending benefits 0.47 
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showed.  The increase of more than R1 200 per person for the poorest 40% of the 
population since 2000 was almost three times as large as for the richest 20% of the 
population, and they now receive considerably larger benefits than before. 
 
In terms of population groups, Figure 9 shows that benefits have shifted towards the 
black and to a lesser extent the coloured population groups, for similar reasons as apply 
for the shifts to the poorer quintiles.  
 
Figure 8: Real per capita benefits from all social spending by quintile, 1995, 2000 
and 2006 (in 2000 Rand values)  
 
 
Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 Total
1995 (in 2000-Rand) R 2 232 R 1 551 R 1 557 R 1 540 R 1 334 R 1 643
2000 R 2 946 R 2 009 R 1 974 R 1 852 R 1 450 R 1 987










R 4 500 
 
21 
Figure 9: Real per capita benefits from all social spending by race group, 1995, 2000 
and 2006 (in 2000 Rand values)  
 
 
Interestingly, targeting within specific social programmes had changed little since 2000, 
as  Table  1  above  had  indicated. The scope for redistribution to eliminate earlier 
discrimination  has  almost  been exhausted. Aggregate social spending became  much 
better targeted largely as a result of structural shifts in the size of different programmes: 
The rapid growth of the best targeted social programme, social grant spending, and the 
decline on the other hand in per student spending on tertiary education, the most poorly 
targeted programme (though note the earlier proviso about the accuracy of the targeting 
information for tertiary education). These changing weights made social spending even 
more redistributive, though further scope for this was diminishing. 
 
Figure 10 indicates some changes in the underlying distribution of pre-transfer income. 
However, there is good reason not to be too confident about these trends, given data 
comparability  issues.  As  the  post-fiscal distribution is affected by the pre-fiscal 
distribution, uncertainty about the latter means that, for measuring changes over time, it is 
better to place the emphasis on fiscal impact from a given distribution of pre-transfer 
income.  A visual comparison of Figure  11,  Figure  12  and Figure 13  illustrates  the 
growing impact of the fiscus in changing distribution, as is evident in the growing gaps 
between the pre- and post-fiscal distributions.  
 
Black  Coloured Indian White Total
1995 (in 2000 Rand) R 1 641 R 1 808 R 2 105 R 1 444 R 1 643
2000 R 2 052 R 1 982 R 2 273 R 1 702 R 1 987
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Figure  10:  Changing pre-transfer income distribution  (Note: This is based on 
somewhat uncertain data about the distribution of income) 
 
 





































Cumulative % of population
Diagonal (Equality)
Income before grants 1995
Income before grants 2000
Income before grants 2006
Gini coefficient for income beforegrants:
1995 Income excl. grants 0.67
2000 Income excl. grants 0.71
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Income before grants 1995
Income minus taxes plus 
social spending 1995
Gini coefficient:
1995 Income excl. grants 0.67
1995 Income minus taxes plus social spending benefits 0.53 
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Figure 12: Effect of fiscal redistribution on income distribution, 2000 
 
 
Figure 13: Effect of fiscal redistribution on income distribution, 2006 
 
 
Table 3 takes this comparison further and shows that the fiscal process has been quite 
redistributive, but that the extremely unequal distribution resulting from the working of 
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Diagonal (Equality)
Income before grants 2000
Income minus taxes plus 
social spending benefits 2000
Gini coefficient:
2000 Income excl. grants 0.71



































Cumulative % of population
Diagonal (Equality)
Income before grants 2006
Income minus taxes plus 
social spending benefits 
2006
Gini coefficient:
2006 Income excl. grants 0.69
2006 Income minus taxes plus social spending benefits 0.47 
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coefficient excluding social transfers was very high. Because of the uncertainty referred 
to above regarding the comparability of the income distributions for different years, one 
should not focus too much on the Gini coefficients themselves, both for pre-transfer 
income and consequently also after considering the effects of the fiscal process. The more 
pertinent figure is the reduction in the Gini that arises from the fiscal process (after taxes 
and social spending), which gives a crude indication of the redistributive power of the 
budget. In 1995, it reduced the Gini compared by 0.138, in 2000 by 0.180, and in 2006 by 
0.223. Clearly, the redistributive power of the budgetary process increased.  
 
Table 3: Concentration ratios and Gini coefficients, 1995, 2000 and 2006 
  1995  2006  2000 
Total social spending  -0.095  -0.112  -0.152 
Total income/expenditure (excluding grants)  0.666  0.707  0.690 
Taxes paid  0.755  0.829  0.829 
Income plus benefits  0.578  0.576  0.523 
Income minus taxes plus benefits  0.528  0.527  0.467 
Effect of fiscal process  -0.138  -0.180  -0.223 
 
Another way of looking at this is to assume a fixed income distribution in 2000, and then 
to consider the impact of the fiscal redistribution process on the Gini, as in Figure 14.  
  
Figure 14: Changing effect of fiscal processes on distribution, assuming unchanged 














































Results: Limitations of expenditure incidence analysis 
Budgetary resources limit social spending increases, as social spending is already well 
targeted in international comparison. Future growth of spending per poor person is thus 
likely to slow. A source of concern is that social spending has often not had the desired 
results in terms of social outcomes. This is clearly the case for social delivery programs, 
where government puts much effort into improving efficiency of resource use and social 
delivery. According to some views, households  too are not all equally effective in 
converting social grant spending into desired improvements in living standards for the 
most vulnerable in such households, e.g. children and old people. There are concerns that 
some households may use such additional resources poorly. 
 
Government has been grappling with serious quality concerns in social spending 
programmes for some time. So, for instance, there is general dissatisfaction with many 
public health services.  Figure 5 shows satisfaction rates for public hospital services 
(mainly visited by non-medical aid members) to be significantly lower than for private 
hospital services (largely used by medical scheme members). Quality concerns about 
services for the poor also arise in education, where there is evidence that “(g)reat 
inequality  of educational outcomes persists despite increased equity in educational 
spending since political transition” (Taylor & Yu 2009: 41). Clearly, equity in fiscal 
incidence of social spending is a necessary but an insufficient requirement for equity in 
social outcomes. 
 
Figure  15: Satisfaction levels with hospital services among members and non-
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This study has shown that fiscal redistribution intensified in the period after 2000 and that 
the expansion of spending on social grants in particular had contributed by 2006 to a 
highly redistributive fiscal stance. Yet, despite this, much inequality remains. The reason 
for this is the massive degree of inequality in pre-transfer income. This remains  the 
biggest challenge to perceived equity of outcomes. 
 
The scope for further fiscal redistribution is now constrained by the size of the budget and 
by the extent of redistribution that has already occurred. In most areas of social spending, 
little scope remains for increasing such redistribution. The major impediment to more 
social equity now rather appears to lie in the inefficiency of the social delivery process 
among the poor. Improved efficiency of social delivery is an issue that has been growing 
in prominence as the scope for more fiscal redistribution declines. 
 
This study has shown that fiscal discrimination has been eliminated. The minor 
differences in spending that remain that favour richer parts of the population arise within 
non-discriminatory frameworks, e.g. more affluent schools attract better qualified 
teachers, and more affluent students have a higher propensity to study in the natural 
sciences, which are more highly subsidised.  But the effect of these issues unequal 
spending outcomes is negligible compared to the excellent targeting of spending towards 
the poor.  
 
The results of this study are not very sensitive to the datasets used or the assumptions 
made. Largely, access to services now  determine  fiscal  spending  incidence, while 
inefficiencies  of social delivery are now a major  influence on inequalities in social 




















Appendix Table 1: Social spending by spending category and quintile, 2000 and 
2006 













Social spending (in millions of constant 2000 Rand values) 
School education  2000  9 194  8 626  7 684  5 919  5 184  36 607 
School education  2006  13 243  11 579  10 359  8 554  6 849  50 601 
Tertiary education  2000  157  316  657  1 908  3 503  6 540 
Tertiary education  2006  67  210  634  1 186  5 398  7 495 
Child support grants  2000  496  312  224  260  119  1 411 
Child support grants  2006  4 606  3 665  2 890  1 980  254  13 395 
Disability grants  2000  1 636  749  588  677  323  3 973 
Disability grants  2006  4 311  2 117  2 150  1 587  818  10 984 
Old-age pensions  2000  6 362  2 062  1 522  1 295  817  12 057 
Old-age pensions  2006  9 650  2 217  1 743  1 861  1 418  16 889 
Public clinics  2000  978  1 028  990  789  227  4 012 
Public clinics  2006  2 033  1 814  1 481  1 077  305  6 709 
Public hospitals  2000  4 272  3 689  4 407  4 209  1 835  18 412 
Public hospitals  2006  5 509  4 813  5 114  4 878  2 784  23 099 
Housing  2000  240  407  851  985  556  3 040 
Housing  2006  268  781  1 514  1 583  246  4 391 
Total social spending  2000  23 336  17 190  16 922  16 041  12 564  86 053 
Total social spending  2006  39 688  27 195  25 886  22 705  18 072  133 563 
Population 
























Per capita social spending (in constant 2000 Rand values per person) 
School education  2000  1 061  987  896  684  599  845 
School education  2006  1 399  1 223  1 094  904  724  1 069 
Tertiary education  2000  18  36  77  220  405  151 
Tertiary education  2006  7  22  67  125  570  158 
Child support grants  2000  57  36  26  30  14  33 
Child support grants  2006  487  387  305  209  27  283 
Disability grants  2000  189  86  69  78  37  92 
Disability grants  2006  455  224  227  168  86  232 
Old-age pensions  2000  734  236  177  150  94  278 
Old-age pensions  2006  1 019  234  184  197  150  357 
Public clinics  2000  113  118  115  91  26  93 
Public clinics  2006  215  192  156  114  32  142  
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Public hospitals  2000  493  422  514  486  212  425 
Public hospitals  2006  582  508  540  515  294  488 
Housing  2000  28  47  99  114  64  70 
Housing  2006  28  83  160  167  26  93 
Total social spending  2000  2 693  1 967  1 973  1 852  1 451  1 987 
Total social spending  2006  4 192  2 873  2 735  2 398  1 909  2 822 
Note: Population quintiles differ in size where some households have exactly the same recorded per capita incomes at the 
boundary values. 
 
Appendix Table 2: Social spending by spending category and race group, 2000 and 
2006 
  Year  Black   Coloured  Indian  White  Total 
Social spending (in millions of constant 2000 Rand values) 
School education  2000  30 709  2 648  733  3 695  37 410 
School education  2006  43 634  3 557  806  2 588  50 601 
Tertiary education  2000  3 710  340  505  1 986  6 540 
Tertiary education  2006  4 390  499  587  2 019  7 495 
Child support grants  2000  953  238  41  172  1 411 
Child support grants  2006  12 655  637  86  16  13 395 
Disability grants  2000  2 554  767  188  463  3 973 
Disability grants  2006  8 799  1 469  259  453  10 984 
Old-age pensions  2000  10 500  921  265  368  12 057 
Old-age pensions  2006  14 390  1 347  377  772  16 889 
Public clinics  2000  3 571  298  58  84  4 012 
Public clinics  2006  6 218  307  92  91  6 709 
Public hospitals  2000  15 107  1 928  701  596  18 412 
Public hospitals  2006  19 273  2 493  481  853  23 099 
Housing  2000  2 492  417  38  88  3 040 
Housing  2006  3 887  433  25  44  4 391 
Total social spending  2000  69 597  7 557  2 530  7 452  86 053 
Total social spending  2006  113 245  10 742  2 713  6 835  133 563 
Population 
Population  2000  33 915 985  3 812 737  1 113 039  4 377 538  43 298 533 
Population  2006  37 626 991  4 187 007  1 160 083  4 358 812  47 332 894 
Per capita social spending (in constant 2000 Rand values) 
School education  2000  905  695  659  844  845 
School education  2006  1 161  850  695  594  1 069 
Tertiary education  2000  109  89  454  454  151 
Tertiary education  2006  117  119  506  463  158 
Child support grants  2000  28  62  37  39  33 
Child support grants  2006  337  152  74  4  283 
Disability grants  2000  75  201  169  106  92  
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Disability grants  2006  234  351  224  104  232 
Old-age pensions  2000  310  242  238  84  278 
Old-age pensions  2006  383  322  325  177  357 
Public clinics  2000  105  78  52  19  93 
Public clinics  2006  165  73  79  21  142 
Public hospitals  2000  445  506  630  136  425 
Public hospitals  2006  513  595  415  196  488 
Housing  2000  73  109  34  20  70 
Housing  2006  103  104  22  10  93 
Total across services  2000  2 052  1 982  2 273  1 702  1 987 
Total across services  2006  3 013  2 566  2 338  1 568  2 822 
 
Appendix Table 3: Income before transfers, benefits from social spending, taxes, 
and derived measures (in constant 2000 Rand values), 1995, 2000 & 2006 













Total income before transfers, benefits from social spending, taxes, and derived measures 
(in millions of constant 2000 Rand values) 
Pre-transfer income  1995  5 439  17 181  36 574  80 650  378 113  517 956 
Pre-transfer income  2000  4 750  11 104  24 203  59 208  350 317  449 582 
Pre-transfer income  2006  3 024  14 927  36 732  83 977  404 166  542 826 
All social spending  1995  18 389  R 12 
781 
12 828  12 692  10 992   67 682 
All social spending  2000  23 336  17 190  16 922  16 041  12 564   86 053 
All social spending  2006  39 688  27 195  25 886  22 705  18 072  133 563 
Income plus social spending  1995  23 828  29 961  49 402  93 342  389 105  585 639 
Income plus social spending  2000  28 086  28 295  41 125  75 249  362 881  535 635 
Income plus social spending  2006  42 712  42 122  62 618  106 682  422 238  676 389 
Tax paid (PIT)  1995  599  1 857  4 452  13 693  107 700  128 301 
Tax paid (PIT)  2000  0  0  778  6 572  79 127  86 478 
Tax paid (PIT)  2006  0  0  945  7 979  96 064  104 988 
Income minus taxes plus social spending  1995  23 228  28 104  44 950  79 650  281 406  457 338 
Income minus taxes plus social spending  2000  28 086  28 295  40 347  68 676  283 754  449 157 
Income minus taxes plus social spending  2006  42 712  42 122  61 673  98 703  326 175  571 401 
Per capita income before transfers, benefits from social spending, taxes, and derived measures 
(in constant 2000 Rand values per person) 
Pre-transfer income  1995  660  2 085  4 439  9 788  45 888  12 572 
Pre-transfer income  2000  548  1 271  2 822  6 837  40 456  10 383 
Pre-transfer income  2006  319  1 577  3 881  8 871  42 695  11 468 
All social spending  1995  2 232  1 551  1 557  1 540  1 334  1 643 
All social spending  2000  2 693  1 967  1 973  1 852  1 451  1 987 
All social spending  2006  4 192  2 873  2 735  2 398  1 909  2 822 
Income plus social spending  1995  2 892  3 636  5 995  11 328  47 221  14 215 
Income plus social spending  2000  3 241  3 238  4 795  8 690  41 907  12 371  
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Income plus social spending  2006  4 511  4 450  6 615  11 269  44 604  14 290 
Tax paid (PIT)  1995  73  225  540  1 662  13 070  3 114 
Tax paid (PIT)  2000  0  0  91  759  9 138  1 997 
Tax paid (PIT)  2006  0  0  100  843  10 148  2 218 
Income minus taxes plus social spending  1995  2 819  3 411  5 455  9 666  34 151  11 100 
Income minus taxes plus social spending  2000  3 241  3 238  4 705  7 931  32 769  10 373 
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